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In the wake of the Mexican and Asian currency turmoil, the subject of financial crises has 
come to the forefront of academic and policy discussions.  This paper analyzes the links between 
banking and currency crises.  We find that: problems in the banking sector typically precede a 
currency crisis--the currency crisis deepens the banking crisis, activating a vicious spiral; 
financial liberalization often precedes banking crises.  The anatomy of these episodes suggests 
that crises occur as the economy enters a recession, following a prolonged boom in economic 
activity that was fueled by credit, capital inflows and accompanied by an overvalued currency.  
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Pervasive currency turmoil, particularly in Latin America in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, gave impetus to a flourishing literature on balance-of-payments crises.  As stressed in 
Paul Krugman’s (1979) seminal paper, in this literature crises occur because a country finances 
its fiscal deficit by printing money to the extent that excessive credit growth leads to the eventual 
collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime.  With calmer currency markets in the mid- and late 
1980s, interest in this literature languished.  The collapse of the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism, the Mexican peso crisis, and the wave of currency crises sweeping through Asia 
have, however, rekindled interest in the topic. Yet, the focus of this recent literature has shifted.  
While the earlier literature emphasized the inconsistency between fiscal and monetary policies 
and the exchange rate commitment, the new one stresses self-fulfilling expectations and herding 
behavior in international capital markets.1  In this view, as Guillermo A.Calvo (1995, page 1) 
summarizes “If investors deem you unworthy, no funds will be forthcoming and, thus, unworthy 
you will be.” 
Whatever the causes of currency crises, neither the old literature nor the new models of 
self-fulfilling crises have paid much attention to the interaction between banking and currency 
problems, despite the fact that many of the countries that have had currency crises have also had 
full-fledged domestic banking crises around the same time.  Notable exceptions are: Carlos 
Diaz-Alejandro (1985), Andres Velasco (1987), Calvo (1995), Ilan Goldfajn and Rodrigo Valdés 
(1995), and Victoria Miller (1995).  As to the empirical evidence on the potential links between 
what we dub the twin crises, the literature has been entirely silent. The Thai, Indonesian, and 
Korean crises are not the first examples of dual currency and banking woes, they are only the 
recent additions to a long list of casualties which includes Chile, Finland, Mexico, Norway, and 
 
 2 
Sweden.  
  In this paper, we aim to fill this void in the literature and examine currency and banking 
crises episodes for a number of industrial and developing countries. The former include: 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.  The latter focus on: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.  The period covered spans the 1970s through 1995.  This sample gives 
us the opportunity to study 76 currency crises and 26 banking crises.  Out-of sample, we 
examine the twin crises in Asia of 1997. 
Charles Kindelberger (1978, page 14), in studying financial crises, observes: “For 
historians each event is unique.  Economics, however, maintains that forces in society and nature 
behave in repetitive ways. History is particular; economics is general.” Like Kindelberger, we 
are interested in finding the underlying common patterns associated with financial crises.  To 
study the nature of crises, we construct a chronology of events in the banking and external 
sectors.  From this timetable, we draw inference about the possible causal patterns among 
banking and balance-of-payments problems and financial liberalization.  We also examine the 
behavior of macroeconomic indicators that have been stressed in the theoretical literature around 
crisis periods, much along the lines of Barry Eichengreen et. al. (1996a).  Our aim is to gauge 
whether the two crises share a common macroeconomic background. This methodology also 
allows us to assess the fragility of economies around the time of the financial crises and sheds 
light on the extent to which the crises were predictable. Our main results can be summarized as 
follows:  
First, with regard to the linkages among the crises, our analysis shows no apparent link 
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between balance of payments and banking crises during the 1970s, when financial markets were 
highly regulated.  In the 1980s, following the liberalization of financial markets across many 
parts of the world, banking and currency crises become closely entwined.  Most often, the 
beginning of banking sector problems predate the balance of payment crisis; indeed, knowing 
that a banking crisis was underway helps predict a future currency crisis.  The causal link, 
nevertheless, is not unidirectional. Our results show that the collapse of the currency deepens the 
banking crisis, activating a vicious spiral.  We find that the peak of the banking crisis most often 
comes after the currency crash, suggesting that existing problems were aggravated or new ones 
created by the high interest rates required to defend the exchange rate peg or the foreign 
exchange exposure of banks. 
Second, while banking crises often precede balance of payments crises, they are not 
necessarily the immediate cause of currency crises, even in the cases where a frail banking sector 
puts the nail in the coffin of what was already a defunct fixed exchange rate system.  Our results 
point to common causes, and whether the currency or banking problems surface first is a matter 
of circumstance.  Both crises are preceded by recessions or, at least, below normal economic 
growth, in part attributed to a worsening of the terms of trade, an overvalued exchange rate, and 
the rising cost of credit; exports are particularly hard hit.  In both types of crises, a shock to 
financial institutions (possibly financial liberalization and/or increased access to international 
capital markets) fuels the boom phase of the cycle by providing access to financing. The 
financial vulnerability of the economy increases as the unbacked liabilities of the banking system 
climb to lofty levels. 
Third, our results show that crises (external or domestic) are typically preceded by a 
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multitude of weak and deteriorating economic fundamentals.  While speculative attacks can and 
do occur as market sentiment shifts and, possibly, herding behavior takes over (crises tend to be 
bunched together), the incidence of crises where the economic fundamentals were sound are rare. 
  Fourth, when we compared the episodes in which currency and banking crises occurred 
jointly to those in which the currency or banking crisis occurred in isolation, we find that for the 
twin crises, economic fundamentals tended to be worse, the economies were considerably more 
frail, and the crises (both banking and currency) were far more severe. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides a chronology of 
the crises and their links.  Section II reviews the stylized facts around the periods surrounding 
the crises while Section III addresses the issues of the vulnerability of economies around the 
time of the crisis and the issue of predictability.  The final section discusses the findings and 
possibilities for future research. 
I. The Links Between Banking and Currency Crises  
This section briefly discusses what the theoretical literature offers as explanations of the 
possible links between the two crises.  The theoretical models also guide our choice of the 
financial and economic indicators used in the analysis. 
A.  The links: theory 
A variety of theoretical models have been put forth to explain the linkages between 
currency and banking crises.  One chain of causation, stressed in James Stoker (1995), runs from 
balance of payments problems to banking crisis. An initial external shock, such as an increase in 
foreign interest rates, coupled with a commitment to a fixed parity will result in the loss of 
reserves.  If not sterilized, this will lead to a credit crunch, increased bankruptcies, and financial 
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crisis.  Moreover, Frederic Mishkin (1996) argues that, if a devaluation occurs, the position of 
banks could be weakened further if a large share of their liabilities is denominated in a foreign 
currency.  Models, such as Velasco (1987), point to the opposite causal direction--financial 
sector problems give rise to the currency collapse.  Such models stress that when central banks 
finance the bail-out of troubled financial institutions by printing money, we return to the 
classical story of a currency crash prompted by excessive money creation.  
A third family of models contend that currency and banking crises have common causes. 
 An example of this may be found in the dynamics of an exchange rate-based inflation 
stabilization plan, such as that of Mexico in 1987. Theory and evidence suggest that such plans 
have well-defined dynamics: 2  Because inflation converges to international levels only gradually, 
there is a marked cumulative real exchange rate appreciation.  Also, at the early stages of the 
plan there is a boom in imports and economic activity, financed by borrowing abroad.  As the 
current account deficit continues to widen, financial markets become convinced that the 
stabilization program is unsustainable, fueling an attack against the domestic currency.  Since the 
boom is usually financed by a surge in bank credit, as banks borrow abroad, when the capital 
inflows become outflows and asset markets crash, the banking system caves in.  Ronald I. 
McKinnon and Huw Pill (1996) model how financial liberalization together with microeconomic 
distortions--such as implicit deposit insurance--can make these boom-bust cycles even more 
pronounced by fueling the lending boom that leads to the eventual collapse of the banking 
system. Ilan Goldfajn and Rodrigo Valdés (1995) show how changes in international interest 
rates and capital inflows are amplified by the intermediating role of banks and how such swings 
may also produce an exaggerated business cycle that ends in bank runs and financial and 
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currency crashes.   
So, while theory does not provide an unambiguous answer as to what the causal links 
between currency and banking crises are, the models are clear as to what economic indicators 
should provide insights about the underlying causes of the twin crises.  High on that list are 
international reserves, a measure of excess money balances, domestic and foreign interest rates, 
and other external shocks, such as the terms of trade.  The inflation stabilization-financial 
liberalization models also stress the boom-bust patterns in imports, output, capital flows, bank 
credit, and asset prices.  Some of these models also highlight overvaluation of the currency, 
leading to the underperformance of exports. The possibility of bank runs suggests bank deposits 
as an indicator of impending crises.  Finally, as in Krugman (1979) currency crises can be the 
byproduct of government budget deficits. 
B.  The Links: Preliminary Evidence 
To examine these links empirically, we first need to identify the dates of currency and 
banking crises.  In what follows, we begin by describing how our indices of financial crises are 
constructed. 
Definitions, dates, and incidence of crises  
Most often, balance of payments crises are resolved through a devaluation of the 
domestic currency or the floatation of the exchange rate.  But central banks can and, on occasion, 
do resort to contractionary monetary policy and foreign exchange market intervention to fight 
the speculative attack.  In these latter cases, currency market turbulence will be reflected in steep 
increases in domestic interest rates and massive losses of foreign exchange reserves.  Hence, an 
index of currency crises should capture these different manifestations of speculative attacks.  In 
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the spirit of Eichengreen, et. al. (1996 a and b), we constructed an index of currency market 
turbulence as a weighted average of exchange rate changes and reserve changes.3  
With regard to banking crises, our analysis stresses events.  The main reason for 
following this approach has to do with the lack of high frequency data that capture when a 
financial crisis is underway.  If the beginning of a banking crisis is marked by a bank runs and 
withdrawals, then changes in bank deposits could be used to date the crises.  Often, the banking 
problems do not arise from the liability side, but from a protracted deterioration in asset quality, 
be it from a collapse in real estate prices or increased bankruptcies in the nonfinancial sector.  In 
this case, changes in asset prices or a large increase in bankruptcies or nonperforming loans 
could be used to mark the onset of the crisis.  For some of the earlier crises in emerging markets, 
however, stock market data is not available.4 Indicators of business failures and nonperforming 
loans are also usually available only at low frequencies, if at all; the latter are also made less 
informative by banks’ desire to hide their problems for as long as possible. 
Given these data limitations, we mark the beginning of a banking crisis by two types of 
events: (1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or 
more financial institutions (as in Venezuela 1993); and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, 
merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or 
group of institutions), that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial 
institutions (as in Thailand 1996-97).  We rely on existing studies of banking crises and on the 
financial press; according to these studies the fragility of the banking sector was widespread 
during these periods. This approach to dating the beginning of the banking crises is not without 
drawbacks.  It could date the crises too late, because the financial problems usually begin well 
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before a bank is finally closed or merged; it could also date the crises too early, because the 
worst of crisis may come later.  To address this issue we also date when the banking crisis hits its 
peak, defined as the period with the heaviest government intervention and/or bank closures.  
Our sample consists of 20 countries for the period 1970-mid-1995. The countries are 
those listed in the introduction and Appendix Tables 1 and 2.  We selected countries on the 
multiple criteria of being small open economies, with a fixed exchange rate, crawling peg, or 
band through portions of the sample; data availability also guided our choices.  This period 
encompasses 26 banking crises and 76 currency crises.  
As to the incidence of the crises (Table 1 and Figure 1), there are distinct patterns across 
decades. During the 1970s we observe a total of 26 currency crises, yet banking crises were rare 
during that period, with only 3 taking place. The absence of banking crises may reflect the highly 
regulated nature of financial markets during the bulk of the 1970s.  By contrast, while the 
number of currency crises per year does not increase much during the 1980s and 1990s (from an 
average of 2.60 per annum to 3.13 per annum, Table 1, first row), the number of banking crises 
per year more than quadruples in the post-liberalization period.  Thus, as the second row of 
Table 1 highlights, the twin crisis phenomenon is one of the 1980s and 1990s.  
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Figure 1 also shows that financial crises were heavily bunched in the early 1980s, when 
real interest rates in the United States were at their highest level since the 1930s.  This may 
suggest that, external factors, such as interest rates in the United States, matter a great deal as 
argued in Calvo, et. al. (1993). Indeed, Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew K. Rose (1996) find that 
foreign interest rates play a significant role in predicting currency crashes.  A second explanation 
why crises are bunched is that contagion effects may be present, creating a domino effect among 
those countries that have anything less than immaculate fundamentals. Sara Calvo and Reinhart 
(1996) present evidence of contagion in capital flows to Latin American countries while 
Eichengreen, et. al.(1996b) find evidence that knowing there is a crisis elsewhere increases the 
probability of a domestic currency crisis. 
Table 2 provides the dates of financial liberalization, the beginning and peak of the 
banking crisis, and the date of the balance of payments crisis that was nearest to the beginning of 
the banking crisis.5 By selecting the nearest currency crisis, whether it predates or follows the 
beginning of the banking crisis, we allow the data to reveal what the temporal patterns are. The 
dates for the remaining crises are given in the Appendix tables. 
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The twin crises 
   We next examine how the currency and banking crises are linked.  We begin by 
calculating the unconditional probability of currency crises and banking crises in our sample. For 
instance, the probability that a currency crisis will occur in the next 24 months over the entire 
sample is simply 24 times 76 (the total number of currency crises in the sample) divided by the 
total number of monthly observations in the sample.  These calculations yield unconditional 
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probabilities for currency and banking crises, which are twenty nine percent and ten percent, 
respectively (Table 3).  The difference in the probabilities of the two kinds of crises highlights 
the relatively higher frequency of currency crises in the sample.   
We next calculate a family of conditional probabilities.  For instance, if knowing that 
there is a banking crisis within the past 24 months helps predict a currency crisis then, the 
probability of a currency crisis, conditioned on information that a banking crisis is underway, 
should be higher than the unconditional probability of a balance of payments crisis.  In other 
words, a banking crisis increases the probability that a country will fall prey to a currency crisis. 
This is precisely what the results summarized in Table 3 show.  The probability of a currency 
crisis conditioned on the beginning of banking sector problems is 46 percent, well above the 
unconditional estimate 29 percent.  Hence, it could be argued, as Diaz Alejandro (1985) and 
Velasco (1987) did for the Chilean crisis in the early 1980s, that, in an important number of 
cases, the bail-out of the banking system may have contributed to the acceleration in credit 
creation observed prior to the currency crises (see Herminio Blanco and Peter M. Garber (1986), 
Sebastian Edwards (1989), and Eichengreen et. al. (1996a), and this paper).  Even in the absence 
of a large-scale bail-out, a frail banking system is likely to tie the hands of the central bank in 
defending the currency--witness Indonesia in August 1997.  
 
 13 
 
 
Notes: The balance-of-payment crisis windows are defined as the 24 months preceding the crisis. The 
banking crisis windows are defined as the 12 months before and the 12 months after the beginning (or 
peak) of the crises. The unconditional probabilities of balance-of-payment and banking crises are 
calculated as the total number of months in the respective crisis windows divided by the total number of 
months in the sample. The balance-of-payment probabilities conditional on a banking crisis (beginning or 
peak) are calculated as the number of months in the balance-of payment crisis windows that occur within 
24 months of the banking crises (beginning or peak) divided by the total number of months in the banking 
crisis windows. The probabilities of banking crises conditional on balance-of-payment crises are 
calculated as the number of months in the banking crisis windows that occur within 24 months of a 
balance-of-payment crisis divided by the total number of  probability of a banking crisis conditional on 
financial liberalization  is calculated as the total number of months in the banking crisis windows that 
occur during times of financial liberalization divided by the total number of months during which the 
banking sector was in a regime of financial liberalization. All probabilities were estimated using the data 
for the 20 countries in the 1970–mid-1995 period. 
 
If, instead, the peak of the banking crisis is used as the conditioning piece of information, 
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 no valuable information is gained; indeed, the conditional probability is 22 percent and below 
the unconditional.  This result follows from the fact that a more common pattern (see Table 2) 
appears to be that the peak of the banking crisis comes after the currency crisis.  For instance, 
knowing that there is a currency crisis does not help predict the onset of a banking crisis, this 
conditional probability is 8 percent; knowing that there was a currency crisis does help to predict 
the probability that the banking crisis will worsen, this conditonal probability is 16 percent. 
Taken together, these results seem to point to the existence vicious circles.  Financial 
sector problems undermine the currency.  Devaluations, in turn, aggravate the existing banking 
sector problems and create new ones.  These adverse feedback mechanisms are in line with those 
suggested by Mishkin (1996) and can be amplified, as we have seen in several of the recent 
Asian crises, by banks’ inadequate hedging of foreign exchange risk.  The presence of vicious 
circles would imply that, a priori, the twin crises are more severe than currency or banking crises 
that occur in isolation. 
To measure the severity of a currency crisis, we focus on a composite measure that 
averages reserve losses and the real exchange rate depreciation.6  For reserves, we use the six-
month percent change prior to the crisis month, as reserve losses typically occur prior to the 
devaluation (if the attack is successful).  For the real exchange rate, we use the six-month percent 
change following the crisis month, because large depreciations occur after, and only if, the 
central bank concedes by devaluing or floating the currency. This measure of severity is 
constructed for each currency crisis in our sample and the averages are reported in Table 4 
separately for the 19 twin crises in our sample and for the others.  In line with our results that the 
beginning of the banking crisis precedes the balance of payments crisis, we define the twin crises 
 
 15 
as those episodes in which a currency crisis follows the beginning of the banking crisis within 
the next 48 months.  For banking crises, we use the bail-out costs, as a percent of GDP, as the 
measure of severity.  As Table 4 highlights, bail-out costs are significantly larger (more than 
double) in the twin crises than for banking crises which were not accompanied by a currency 
crisis.  As to balance of payments crises, the results are mixed.  Reserve losses sustained by the 
central bank are significantly bigger (Table 4) but the real depreciations are of comparable orders 
of magnitude.    
 
Notes: Loss of reserves is the percentage change in the level of reserves in the six months preceding the 
crises. Real depreciation is the percentage change in the real exchange rate (with respect to the dollar for 
the countries that peg to the dollar and with respect to the mark for the countries that peg to mark) in the 
six months following the crises. The composite index is the unweighted average of the loss of reserves 
and real depreciation. Episodes in which the beginning of a banking crisis is followed by a balance-of-
payments crisis within 48 months are classified as twin crises.  
* Denotes that the measure of severity of single-crises episodes is statistically different from the twin-
crises severity at the 5-percent level. An NA denotes not applicable. 
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Our results also yield an insight as to the links of crises with financial liberalization 
(Table 3).  In 18 of the 26 banking crises studied here, the financial sector had been liberalized 
during the preceding five years,  usually less.  Only in a few cases in our sample countries, such 
as the early liberalization efforts of Brazil in 1975 and Mexico in 1974, was the liberalization not 
followed by financial sector stress.  In the 1980s and 1990s most liberalization episodes have 
been associated with financial crises of varying severity.  Only in a handful of countries (for 
instance, Canada which is not in the sample) did financial sector liberalization proceed smoothly. 
 Indeed, the probability of a banking crisis (beginning) conditional on financial liberalization 
having taken place is higher than the unconditional probability of a banking crisis. This suggests 
that the twin crises may have common origins in the deregulation of the financial system and the 
boom-bust cycles and asset bubbles that, all too often, accompany financial liberalization.  The 
stylized evidence presented in Gerald Caprio and Daniela Klingebiel (1996) suggests that 
inadequate regulation and lack of supervision at the time of the liberalization may play a key role 
in explaining why deregulation and banking crises are so closely entwined. 
II.  The Macroeconomic Background of the Crises  
To shed light on whether both types of crises may have common roots, we analyze the 
evolution of 16 macroeconomic and financial variables around the time of the crises.  The 
variables used in the analysis were chosen in light of theoretical considerations and subject to 
data availability.  Monthly data was used to get a clearer view (than would otherwise be revealed 
by lower frequency data) of developments as the crisis approaches and by the desire to evaluate 
to what extent these indicators were giving an early signal of impending trouble--an issue that 
will be taken up in the next section.  
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  The indicators associated with financial liberalization are the M2 multiplier, the ratio of 
domestic credit to nominal GDP, the real interest rate on deposits, and the ratio of 
lending-to-deposit interest rates. Other financial indicators include: excess real M1 balances, real 
commercial bank deposits, and the ratio of M2 (converted into U.S. dollars) divided by foreign 
exchange reserves (in U.S. dollars).7 The indicators linked to the current account include the 
percent deviation of the real exchange rate from trend, as a measure of misalignment, the value 
of exports and imports (in U.S. dollars), and the terms-of-trade.8 The indicators associated with 
the capital account are: foreign exchange reserves (in U.S. dollars) and the domestic-foreign real 
interest rate differential on deposits (monthly rates in percentage points).  The indicators of the 
real sector are industrial production and an index of equity prices (in U.S. dollars). 9 Lastly, the 
fiscal variable is the overall budget deficit as a percent of GDP. 
Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of potential indicators.  In particular, political 
variables, such as the timing of an election, can also be linked to the timing of these crises.  
Indeed, the evidence presented in Deepak Mishra (1997), who examines a subset of the currency 
crises in this study, suggests that devaluations, more often than not, follow elections.  Indeed, an 
election raises the probability of a future devaluation, even after controlling for economic 
fundamentals. 
Except for the interest rate variables, the deviations of the real exchange rate from trend, 
our proxy for excess real M1 balances, and the lending/deposit interest rates ratio, which are in 
levels, we focus on the 12-month percent changes of the remaining 10 variables. The pre- and 
post-crises behavior of all variables is compared to the average behavior during tranquil periods, 
which are all the remaining observations in our sample and serves as our control group. 
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Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate the behavior of the variables around the time of the balance 
of payments, banking crises, and twin crises, respectively; each panel portrays a different 
variable. The horizontal axis records the number of months before and after the beginning of the 
crises; the vertical axis records the percent difference (percentage point difference for interest 
rates) between tranquil and crisis periods.  In all the figures the solid line represents the average 
for all the crises for which data was available.10 Hence, if no data points are missing, the solid 
line represents the average behavior of that indicator during the months around 76 currency 
crises and 26 banking crises. For Figures 2 and 3, the dotted lines denote plus/minus one 
standard error around the average.  For example, the top center panel of Figure 2 shows that, on 
average, the 12-month growth in the domestic credit/GDP ratio is about 15 percent higher than in 
tranquil times.  In Figure 4 the solid line shows the evolution of the indicators for the twin crises 
episodes while the dashed line denotes the averages for the currency crises that were not 
accompanied by a banking crisis. 
For currency crises we focus on the 18-month period before and after the crisis.  Unlike 
balance of payments crises, in which reserves are lost abruptly and currency pegs abandoned, 
banking crises are protracted affairs which tend to come in waves and, hence, the depth of the 
crisis is seldom reached at the first sign of outbreak (see Table 2).  For this reason, we widen the 
window and focus on the 18 months before the onset of the crisis, a 18-month arbitrarily chosen 
crisis period, and the 18 months post-crisis period.  At any rate, because most of our analysis 
focuses on the causes leading up to the crises, our main results will not be affected whether the 
crises lasted less or more than a year.  For the 19 episodes of the twin crises, we focus on the 18 
months prior to the balance of payments crisis. Given that banking crises usually predate 
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currency crises in our sample, this implies we are already looking at a period of heavy financial 
sector stress. 
A.  The Financial Sector 
Until the 1970s, most financial markets were regulated with rationed credit and, often, 
negative real interest rates. The late 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, however, witnessed 
sweeping financial reforms both in developed and emerging markets, which led to, among other 
things, increases in real interest rates. 11 Because financial liberalization often precedes banking 
crises--the indicators associated with financial liberalization presented in the first four panels of 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 (from left to right) merit scrutiny. The growth in the M2 multiplier rises 
steadily up to nine months prior to the currency crisis and the onset of the banking crisis; indeed, 
for banking crises the multiplier grows at above normal rate in the entire 18 months prior to the 
crisis.  The draconian reductions in reserve requirements that often accompany financial 
liberalization play a role in explaining the large increases in the M2 multiplier.  Yet the rise in 
the multiplier prior to currency crises is entirely accounted for by its evolution ahead of the twin 
crises, as shown in Figure 4. 
The growth in domestic credit/ GDP remains above normal as the balance of payments 
crisis nears (Figure 2) but particularly accelerating markedly as the twin crises approaches; 
throughout this period it remains well above the growth rates recorded for tranquil periods, 
consistent with a credit boom (and bust) story.  This ratio also rises in the early phase of the 
banking crisis.  It may be that, as the crisis unfolds, the central bank may be pumping money to 
the banks to alleviate their financial situation or the evolution of the denominator has changed.  
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  While credit is rapidly expanding 18 to 6 months before the crisis, the economy is still in 
a vigorous expansion phase (see below), with healthy GDP growth.  The leveraging of 
households and business becomes evident as the economy slips into recession. The real interest 
rate evolves very differently ahead of balance of payments and banking crises.  For currency 
crises, interest rates bounce around in the range of 0 to 2 percentage points per month below the 
average during periods of tranquility--this may reflect lax monetary policy ahead of the currency 
crisis or simply the fact that 26 of the currency crises are in the 1970s, when interest rates were 
regulated and not particularly informative.  By contrast, prior to banking crises and, therefore, 
twin crises (which are almost exclusively in the post-liberalization part of the sample) real 
interest rates are 1 to 2 percentage points higher (at a monthly rate) than in tranquil times in the 
pre-crisis period.  The above normal real interest rates may have a variety of causes: These could 
be the product of a recent financial liberalization; high real rates could also reflect increased 
risk-taking by banks;12  they could be the product of a tight monetary policy stance.  Real interest 
rates do not return to their levels in tranquil times as the crisis deepens, perhaps reflecting that 
banks may respond to deposit withdrawals by keeping deposit interest rates high.  The lending-
deposit rate ratio hovers around its level in tranquil times up until about six months prior to the 
balance of payments crises and then begins to climb; by the time of the crisis it is about 10 
percent higher than in tranquil times, possibly reflecting a deterioration in credit risk. For 
banking crises, the lending/deposit ratio remains close normal levels in the pre-crisis period.  
Only at around the peak of the banking crises does the lending/deposit ratio increase above its 
level in tranquil times, as banks become increasingly unwilling to lend. 
The next three panels show the evolution of the monetary indicators. The middle panel in 
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the second row of Figures 2 and 3 show the excess M1 balances.  The periods prior to the 
currency and banking crises are characterized by an excess supply of real M1 balances; the 
excess liquidity is particularly pronounced for the twin crises episodes, which nearly account for 
all the above-normal behavior ahead of currency crises.  Without overinterpreting this result, 
given the shortcomings of money-demand estimation, the picture that emerges is consistent with 
the deficit-financing as in the Krugman (1979) framework or the excess liquidity may be created 
to ease conditions for troubled financial institutions. In any case, at some point the excess 
liquidity becomes incompatible with maintaining the exchange rate commitment--and a currency 
crisis emerges.  This would suggest that the high real interest rates prior to banking crises were 
due to factors other than monetary policy. The next panel shows the evolution of the 12-month 
change in M2/ reserves of central banks.  For both currency and banking crises, this ratio grows 
well above its norm prior to the crises.  The increases are associated with both a vigorous 
expansion in M2 (witness the multiplier) and a sharp decline in foreign currency reserves 
(discussed below). As Calvo and Enrique Mendoza (1996) do for Mexico 1994, we find that the 
M2/reserves ratio over the 76 currency crises indicates an abrupt decrease in the backing-ratio in 
the months preceding the crisis. Indeed, the growth rate is 70 percent in excess of the tranquil 
period average, highlighting vulnerability of the system.  This observation is equally descriptive 
of both single currency and twin crises episodes. The growth rate of bank deposits remains close 
to normal during the 18 months prior to the financial crises, but the loss of deposits accelerates 
as the crises unfold. There may be multiple reasons for this sudden decline.  Past-financial crises 
periods have often been characterized by massive and persistent capital-flight.  Deposits only 
start to recover a year and a half after the onset of the financial crises. 
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B.  The External Sector  
The next four panels of Figures 2, 3, and 4 present indicators associated with the current 
account.  The middle panel of the third row in each figure chronicles the abysmal performance of 
the growth of exports in the year-and-a-half preceding the currency and banking crises--exports 
consistently underperform normal times during this period.  By the time a balance of payments 
crisis is underway, export growth is about 20 percent below (annual rate) the average growth 
observed in tranquil periods.  Once the appreciation is reversed, export performance improves 
sharply, outdoing the performance observed during tranquil periods about nine months after the 
crisis began.  Export performance is particularly poor during the twin crises episodes.  The 
behavior of import growth is more difficult to justify on the basis of relative price developments 
(see below).  Import growth remains close to the norm during tranquil periods up to about nine 
months before a currency crisis and then declines; for banking crises, we see the tail end of the 
import boom and the subsequent slide prior to the crisis.  During this pre-crisis period, income 
and relative price effects are moving in opposite directions, and the observed decline in import 
growth may well be accounted for by the slowdown in economic activity (see below) during that 
time.  Import growth remains below that of normal periods throughout the post-crisis period. 
The next panel provides evidence on the terms of trade.  Crises are preceded, on average, 
by a deterioration of the terms of trade, with an annual decline that is about 10 percent deeper 
than those observed in tranquil times prior to a balance of payments crisis.  This persistent 
adverse performance of the terms of trade erodes purchasing power and may also account for the 
weakness in imports in the months preceding the crisis.  This weakness is equally evident in 
single and twin crises episodes.  For banking crises, up to about a year prior to the crisis terms of 
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trade shocks appear to have been positive--perhaps helping to explain the earlier boom (see 
below); as the crises nears we see some evidence of adverse terms of trade shocks. The middle 
panel in the fourth row shows the evolution of real exchange rates.  During the year before the 
balance of payments and banking crises (as stressed in Rudiger Dornbusch, et. al,. 1996), the real 
exchange rate shows evidence of being overvalued, relative to its average level during tranquil 
times.  In periods preceding the currency crash, it is appreciating relative to its trend (an 
overvaluation of about 20 percent relative to tranquil periods).  The real exchange rate 
appreciation does reverse itself rapidly with the devaluation, suggesting that productivity shocks 
or preference changes were unlikely to account for the initial appreciation.  Exchange rate-based 
inflation stabilization plans have often given rise to large cumulative real exchange rate 
appreciations, as domestic inflation fails to converge to international levels.  As noted in 
Reinhart and Végh (1995), many of those plans ended in a balance of payments crisis.  
Following the crash, the real exchange rate depreciates substantially (and is about 10 percent 
higher than in tranquil times).  Over time, higher domestic inflation erodes in part the 
improvement in competitiveness.    
In the absence of monthly data on capital flows for most of the period and most of the 
countries in our sample, we extract information about capital account developments by focusing 
on the indicators shown in the next two panels.  As expected, the 12-month percentage change in 
foreign exchange reserves of the central banks falls substantially in the months prior to both 
banking and balance of payments crises.  The loss of reserves is particularly steep and longer-
lived following the crises for the 19 twin crises episodes.  As early as 12 months prior to the 
balance of payments crisis, reserve growth is about 20 percent below that observed during 
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tranquil periods; although we report 12-month changes, which introduces positive serial 
correlation in the data, reserves do not decrease continuously.  There are modest short-lived 
reversals in the path followed by reserves, which suggest that the central banks may have had 
spells in which they fought the reserve loss with contractionary monetary policy (note that there 
are brief spells where real interest rates rise prior to the crisis--see third panel) before finally 
conceding defeat and devaluing.  Following the devaluation (or flotation), foreign exchange 
reserves of central banks start to increase again.   
Finally, the first panel in the bottom row shows the evolution of the domestic-foreign 
real interest rate differential on deposits.  Interest differentials do not reflect increasing 
expectations of a devaluation as the currency crisis nears. Turning to banking crises, the picture 
that emerges is quite distinct from its counterpart in Figure 2; while in balance of payments 
crises interest rate differentials were not appreciably different from tranquil periods prior to 
crises, differentials in the case of banking crises remain above those observed in periods of 
tranquility. One explanation for this difference among the two crises has to do with the bunching 
of the banking crises in the post financial liberalization period. 
C. The Real Sector 
The last two panels in the Figures show the evolution of output growth and changes in 
stock prices. The deterioration of the terms of trade, the overvaluation of the currency, the 
weakening export performance is reflected in a marked slowing in economic activity and a 
decline in output prior to both crises.  For balance of payments crises, the 12-month growth in 
output bounces in a range of 2 to 6 percent below the comparable growth rates during tranquil 
periods--with a tendency for the recession to deepen as the crisis nears.  Interestingly, and in line 
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with the greater severity of the twin crises, the combination of currency and banking problems 
appears to take a more devastating toll on the real economy as the recession is far deeper and 
longer than the recessions associated with currency crashes alone.  At growth rates which are 
eight percent below those observed in tranquil periods, the twin crisis recession is twice as 
severe.  As Kindelberger (1978) observes: “Financial crises are associated with the peaks in 
business cycles ... the financial crisis is a culmination of a period of economic expansion that 
leads to downturn”  While in the 18 months prior to a balance of payments crisis there is no 
evidence of a residual economic boom, that is not the case in the pre-banking crisis period.  As 
Figure 3 shows, up to about 8 months before the banking crises the economy was recording 
growth rates above those observed during tranquil periods.  Yet, the real exchange rate 
appreciation that characterizes pre-crisis periods is often cited as a key factor behind the squeeze 
in profit margins that eventually leads to increased bankruptcies, a rise in nonperforming loans, a 
deepening in the economic contraction, and banking sector problems.   
The last panel shows the evolution of stock prices.  During the 18 months prior to a 
balance of payments crisis, the equity market steadily underperforms (relative to tranquil times); 
at first, not by much but as the crisis nears changes in stock prices, that is stock returns (in 
dollars) are about 40 percent below those observed in non-crisis periods.  The weakening in 
equity prices is, most likely, reflecting both the deteriorating cyclical position of the economy, 
reduced foreign demand as capital inflows are reversed, and the worsening balance sheets of 
firms, as the overvaluation takes its toll.  The crash is particularly severe when currency and 
banking crises nearly coincide (Figure 4).  Unlike the onset of a banking crisis (see below), the 
equity market was already past it cyclical peak well before the crisis begins.  On the eve of 
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banking crises, the return on equity prices up to about nine months prior to the crises suggest a 
boom (relative to tranquil periods) which may (or may not ) be an asset-price bubble.  During the 
boom phase, returns exceed those of non-crises periods by about 40 percent on an annual basis. 
The beginning of the recession is also reflected in the stock market, which collapses the year 
before the crisis; this collapse is also apparent in other asset markets, most notably real estate.13 
Finally, although not shown in the figures, the fiscal deficit/GDP ratio is higher in the 
two years prior to the currency crisis and one year prior to the banking crisis.  While the bigger 
deficit could stem from higher government spending, the weakness in output prior to crises could 
lead to a shortfall in revenues.  
III. The Anatomy of Crises 
In what follows, we offer an alternative approach to examine the evolving nature of the 
crises, pinpoint their origin, and gauge their probability conditioned on signals from one or more 
indicators.  The methodology used, while not previously applied to analyze currency and 
banking crises, has a long history in the rich literature that evaluates the ability of 
macroeconomic and financial time series to predict business cycle turning points.14 The 
remainder of this section is divided into two parts, the first describes the statistical methodology 
used, while the second applies that methodology to the 102 currency and banking crises that 
make up our sample. 
A. Methodology  
To examine the causes of crises, gauge the vulnerability of the economy on the eve of 
crisis, and assess whether the crisis itself could be forecasted by anomalous economic 
developments, we need to make four sets of judgments: First, we must have a well-defined 
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notion of what is classified as a crisis. Second, we must agree on a list of variables that are 
potential leading indicators. Third, we need to decide upon a criteria that allows us to classify the 
behavior of an indicator as either a signal of a crisis or normal (no signal). Last, if an indicator is 
giving a signal, we have to determine if a crisis happens within a reasonable period of time or if 
the signal was a false alarm. Hence, we also need to define what is considered to be a reasonable 
period of time. Section I dealt with the definition and dating of banking and currency crises, 
while the previous Section and the Data Appendix discuss the indicators. In this subsection, we 
describe the approach used to define what is a signal and what is a reasonable period of time. 
The interval between signals and crisis: Defining a reasonable period of time 
In what follows, the maximum interval of time between the signal and the crisis, was 
decided upon a-priori as 24 months in the case of balance of payments crises.15  Hence, any 
signal given within the 24-month period before the beginning of the crisis is labeled a good 
signal; any other signal outside that 24-month window is labeled a false alarm or noise. For 
banking crises, any signal given within the 12-month period before the beginning of the crisis or 
within 12 months following the beginning of the crisis is labeled a good signal.  The two 
different signaling windows for currency and banking crises have to do with the different timing 
of the peaks of both crises, as previously discussed. In addition, the events that mark the 
beginning of a banking crisis are often not seen as systemic at the time and are not treated by 
policymakers as harbingers of a crisis. Since symptoms of a crisis are sometimes evident well 
before the crises erupt,  the narrower windows (say, 12-months) were thought to penalize 
indicators (such as M2/Reserves) that tend to give an early warning.   
The threshold: Defining a signal 
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In Section II we noted that the crises were preceded by marked declines in equity returns. 
 Yet, surely, not every decline in equity returns presages a crisis. Hence, we need to select an 
appropriate threshold or cutoff  that separates when a decline in equity returns is considered a 
signal of a crisis and when it is not.  As is the case of selecting the size of the rejection region in 
hypothesis testing, choosing the optimal threshold involves a tradeoff.  Suppose that our null 
hypothesis is that we are in a tranquil state of nature and (for a particular country) we were 
weighing whether to arbitrarily set the threshold for annual equity returns at minus 15 percent or 
at minus 40 percent.  Suppose further, that for this country 10 percent of the observations posted 
annual equity returns below 15 percent, but only 3 percent of the observations showed equity 
returns below 40 percent.  Our aim is to use the readings for this indicator to test the null 
hypothesis that we are in a tranquil state of nature.  If we choose the minus 15 percent threshold, 
the size of α (the rejection region) is 10 percent--this is the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis when it is true (Type I error).  In this case, the threshold may be too lax--it is likely to 
catch all the crises but it also likely generate a lot of false alarms.  Instead, we could adopt the 
minus 40 percent threshold, which cuts the size of α to 3 percent; this reduces the probability of 
Type I error at the expense of increasing the probability of Type II error (not rejecting the null 
hypothesis when it is false).  With this tight threshold we may miss all but the most severe of the 
crises--the price of reducing the number of false alarms is accurately calling a lower proportion 
of crises.    
We select the threshold value on an indicator-by-indicator basis, by performing a fine 
grid search over a broad range of critical regions up to a maximum of 30 percent. For each 
threshold value in our grid search we compute the noise-to-signal ratio.16 We then select the 
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threshold value that minimizes the noise-to-signal ratio.  As to the location of the rejection 
region, whether it is the upper or lower tail of the frequency distribution for each indicator, we 
rely on the theory as a guide. The threshold values for the 16 indicators, as well as the location of 
the rejection region and its theoretical justification are given in Table 5.  For example, for 
currency and banking crises large output declines signal a crisis, so a < sign in Table 5 denotes 
that the rejection region is located at the bottom tail of the distribution. 
This criterion does have drawbacks which are worth mentioning. First, if an indicator 
gives an early signal and policymakers heed the signal and preempt a crisis, that signal is labeled 
as false and the indicator is penalized with an unduly high noise-to-signal ratio. In addition, a 
signal within the window is treated the same irrespective of whether it was given 12 months 
before the crisis erupts or only the month before.  Naturally, from the vantage point of the 
policymaker the earlier signal is the more valuable one. 
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B. The Anatomy of Crises  
The methodology just described was applied to the 16 indicators and 102 crises, in the 
sample and the four recent Asian crises out-of-sample. 
Appendix Tables 1 and 2 show the results on a crisis-by-crisis and indicator-by-indicator 
basis.  An NA denotes some or all the observations were missing during the pre-crisis 24-month 
window; a 1 denotes at least one signal was given during the 24-month window, and a zero 
indicates no signals were issued.  Hence, for example, column (12) in Appendix Table 1 scores 
the performance of foreign exchange reserves; there are four NA entries, hence we have full data 
for this indicator for 72 balance of payments crises.  In 75 percent of the crises (row (1)  
Summary Statistics, bottom of the table) there were one or more signals during the 24 months 
prior to the crisis.  The last column (17) lists what proportion (in percent) of the indicators were 
sending signals.  Data availability permitting, the tables also show  the evolution of the 
indicators out-of-sample for the Asian crises of 1997. 
About the origins of crises  
Table 6 summarizes the results in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.  The indicators are shown 
individually and are also grouped into sectors along the lines described in the previous section: 
financial liberalization, other financial, current account, capital account, real-side, and fiscal.  
For balance of payments crises, we also examine subsamples before financial liberalization, 
which encompasses the 1970s  and after financial liberalization as well as those currency crises 
which occured alongside a banking crises. The latter appear under the column labelled Twin. As 
nearly all banking crises fall in the post-liberalization period, no subsamples for these are 
reported. Table 6 presents the percentage of crises accurately called by each indicator.  As to the 
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various groups we also report the simple arithmetic average of the proportion of crises accurately 
called by all the indicators in that subgroup.  Capital account indicators accurately called the 
highest proportion of balance of payments crises (about 81 percent).  Financial liberalization 
indicators were next in line, accurately signaling 74 percent of the currency crises before they 
occurred; for the twin crises their performance is even better.  Among the capital account and 
financial indicators that fared the worst are bank deposits, the lending-deposit ratio and excess 
M1 balances.  Current account indicators followed next (68 percent accurately called) but this is 
largely owing to the weak performance of imports in accurately calling crises; exports, the terms 
of trade, and the real exchange rate do much better. The fiscal variable fared the worst, 
accurately calling only slightly over a quarter of the currency crises.    
One key difference between banking and currency crises, highlighted in Table 6, is the 
role of the real sector, which appears to be considerably more important for banking 
crises--giving early signals in 85 percent of the crises.17  Indeed, output and stock prices signaled 
in 89 and 81 percent, respectively, of the banking crises for which data for these indicators was 
available.  As much of the literature on banking crises stresses, particularly asymmetric 
information models (see Charles W. Calomiris and Gary Gorton (1991)), the evidence presented 
here suggests that the bursting of asset price bubbles and increased bankruptcies associated with 
an economic downturn appear to be closely linked to domestic financial problems.  
Yet another feature that is revealed in Table 6, is that the proportion of crises accurately 
called rises for 13 out of the 16 indicators when single currency crises are compared to their twin 
counterparts. The improved performance of most of the indicators is not entirely surprising, in 
light of the greater severity of the twin crises episodes. 
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Fragility on the eve of crises  
Table 7 presents strong evidence that, for both banking and currency crises, multiple 
economic problems were simultaneously building.  We construct a measure of the fragility of the 
economy in the 24 months preceding the crisis by tallying on a crisis-by-crisis basis what 
proportion of the indicators were signaling during that period.18  Hence, if 14 of the 16 indicators 
are sending a signal prior to the crisis, this crisis would be counted in the first row of Table 7, 
labeled  80% to 100% .  It appears that crises are not simply a story of an overvalued exchange 
rate or too rapid a monetary expansion. In about 30 percent of the currency crises, 80 percent or 
more of the indicators were sending signals. The economies appear to be particularly frail on the 
eve of twin crises, with a higher proportion of the indicators signaling.  Indeed, in about 80 
percent of the twin crises, at least 60 percent of the indicators were sending a signal.  There were 
basically no banking with less than 20 percent of the indicators signaling.  For further evidence 
of the diversity of the economic problems on the eve of crises on a crisis-by-crisis basis see 
Appendix Tables 1 and 2.   The finding that when the balance of payments crises occur jointly 
with a banking crisis (under the heading Twin, Table 7) economies appear have more widespread 
problems perhaps is not entirely surprising , given the earlier results which suggest the twin 
crises tend to be more severe.  
These results would appear to suggest that the overwhelming majority of crises, external 
or domestic, have a multitude of weak economic fundamentals at their core.  While speculative 
attacks do occur as market sentiment shifts and, possibly, herding behavior takes over, such 
self-fulfilling crises appear to be quite rare.  Indeed, in the context of the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism crises this issue has been the subject of much debate.19 Not only are the signals 
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many, but their sources are multiple, as shown in  Table 7--with the financial sector external 
(capital account) and domestic playing a key role. 
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VI. Final Remarks  
We have examined the empirical regularities and the sources and scope of problems in 
the onset of 76 currency crises and 26 banking crises. We find that banking and currency crises 
are closely linked in the aftermath of financial liberalization, with banking crises, in general, 
beginning before the currency collapse.  We also find evidence of vicious cycles, in which the 
currency collapse further undermines an already ailing banking sector.  When currency and 
banking crises occur jointly, they are far more severe than when they occur in isolation.  In both 
types of crises, a financial shock, possibly financial liberalization or increased access to 
international capital markets, appear to activate a boom-bust cycle by providing easy access to 
financing.  Finally, in both crises we find a multitude of weak and deteriorating economic 
fundamentals suggesting that it would be difficult to characterize them as self-fulfilling crises. 
During much of 1997 and 1998, the financial press has frequently stressed that the crises 
in Asia are a new breed, as they supposedly occured against a backdrop of immaculate fiscal and 
economic fundamentals. Yet our analysis of earlier episodes reveals that many of the features 
and antecedents of the crises in Asia were common to a substantial number of crisis episodes in 
Latin America, Europe, and elsewhere.  Consider an economy that had successfully stabilized 
inflation, enjoyed an economic boom, and was running fiscal surpluses.  However, this economy 
had liberalized its capital account and its domestic financial sector amidst an environment of 
weak regulation and poor banking supervision.  Banking sector problems emerged and 
intensified, eventually undermining the ability of the central bank to maintain its exchange rate 
committment.  While this profile fits Asia rather well, this was Diaz Alejandro’s description of 
 
 40 
the antecedents to the fierce Chilean crisis of 1982.  At the roots of the meltdown of the Thai 
baht, Korean won and Indonesian rupiah lay systemic banking problems.  Thus, it would appear 
that we can only consider these crises as a new breed if we ignore the numerous lessons history 
offers.  Thus, among the lessons that emerge from this analysis is the obvious case for strong 
banking regulation and supervision to allow countries to sail smoothly through the perilous 
waters of financial liberalization. Yet, the Asian episodes of 1997-98, like many of their earlier 
Latin American counterparts, also remind us that capital inflows can on occasion be too much of 
a good thing. 
The results presented in this paper are a first step in evaluating the complex linkages 
between currency and domestic financial crises.  Analyzing how the authorities deal with the 
banking problems and how the problems affect exchange rate expectations will help determine 
whether a banking crises will lead to a balance of payments crisis.  We have only considered 
macroeconomic data in our list of indicators, but data of the health of bank balance sheets would 
be a logical complement to the macro data. Future analysis could provide a more detailed 
evaluation of the univariate and multivariate signaling properties of various macroeconomic time 
series and composite indices along the lines of Stock and Watson (1989) and Diebold and 
Rudebusch (1989). Indeed, that would appear to be a logical first step in the design of an early 
warning system designed to help detect when a crisis is coming.   
While this paper has focused on the similarities and common patterns across crises, it 
would also be useful to investigate whether there is evidence of distinct regional patterns.  Why 
is it that in some countries currency crises and banking crises are not associated with deep and 
protracted recessions, while in others, notably in Latin America, the aftermath is so severe?  
 
 41 
Lastly, events (such as a balance of payments crises in a neighboring country) may also help 
assess whether a crisis is brewing in the home front; hence, the role of contagion effects may 
warrant further scrutiny. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
Index of Currency Market Turbulence 
The index, I, is a weighted average of the rate of change of the exchange rate, Δe/e, and of 
reserves, ΔR/R, with weights such that the two components of the index have equal sample 
volatilities. 
 
 
Where σe is the standard deviation of the rate of change of the exchange rate and σR is the 
standard deviation of the rate of change of reserves. Since changes in the exchange rate enter 
with a positive weight and changes in reserves have a negative weight attached, readings of this 
index that were three standard deviations or more above the mean were cataloged as crises.  
For countries in the sample that had hyperinflation, the construction of the index was 
modified. While a 100-percent devaluation may be traumatic for a country with low-to-moderate 
inflation, a devaluation of that magnitude is commonplace during hyperinflations. A single index 
for the countries that had hyperinflation episodes would miss sizable devaluations and reserve 
losses in the moderate inflation periods, since the historic mean is distorted by the high inflation 
episode. To avoid this, we divided the sample according to whether inflation in the previous six 
months was higher than 150 percent and then constructed an index for each subsample. Our 
cataloging of crises for the countries coincides fairly highly with our chronology of currency 
market disruptions. Eichengreen et al. (1996b) also include interest rates in this index; however, 
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our data on market-determined interest rates on developing countries does not span the entire 
sample. 
The Indicators 
Sources: International Financial Statistics (IFS), International Monetary Fund (IMF), various 
issues; Emerging Market Indicators, International Finance Corporation (IFC), various 
issues; World Development Indicators, World Bank (WB), various issues. When data was 
missing from these sources, central-bank bulletins and other country-specific sources were 
used as supplements. Unless otherwise noted, we used 12-month percent changes. 
1. M2 multiplier: The ratio of M2 (IFS lines 34 plus 35) to base money (IFS line 14). 
2. Domestic credit/GDP: IFS line 52 divided by IFS line 64 to obtain domestic credit in real 
terms, which was then divided by IFS line 99b.p. (interpolated) to obtain the domestic 
credit/GDP ratio. Monthly real GDP was interpolated from annual data. 
3. Real interest rate: Deposit rate (IFS line 60) deflated using consumer prices (IFS line 64). 
Monthly rates expressed in percentage points. In levels. 
4. Lending-deposit rate ratio: IFS line 60p divided by IFS line 60 was used in lieu of 
differential to ameliorate the distortions caused by the large percentage point spreads observed 
during high inflation. In levels. 
5. Excess M1 balances: M1 (IFS line 34) deflated by consumer prices (IFS line 64) 
less an estimated demand for money. The demand for real balances is determined by real 
GDP (interpolated IFS line 99b.p), domestic consumer price inflation, and a time trend. 
Domestic inflation was used in lieu of nominal interest rates, as market-determined interest 
rates were not available during the entire sample for a number of countries; the time trend (which 
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can enter log-linearly, linearly, or exponentially) is motivated by its role as a proxy for 
financial innovation and/or currency substitution. In levels. 
6. M2/reserves: IFS lines 34 plus 35 converted into dollars (using IFS line ae) divided by 
IFS line 1L.d.  
7. Bank deposits: IFS line 24 plus 25 deflated by consumer prices (IFS line 64). 
8. Exports: IFS line 70. 
9. Imports: IFS line 71. 
10. Terms of trade: The unit value of exports (IFS line 74) over the unit value of imports (IFS 
line 75). For those developing countries where import unit values (or import price indices) 
were not available, an index of prices of manufactured exports from industrial countries to 
developing countries was used. 
11. The real exchange rate: The real exchange-rate index is derived from a nominal 
exchange-rate index, adjusted for relative consumer prices (IFS line 64). The measure is 
defined as the relative price of foreign goods (in domestic currency) to the price of domestic 
goods. The nominal exchange-rate index is a weighted average of the exchange rates of the 
19 OECD countries with weights equal to the country trade shares with the OECD countries. 
Since not all real appreciations reflect disequilibrium phenomena, we focus on deviations of 
the real exchange rate from trend. The trend was specified as, alternatively, log, linear, and 
exponential; the best fit among these was selected on a country-by-country basis. In levels. 
12. Reserves: IFS line 1L.d. 
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13. Real interest-rate differential: Interest rates in the domestic economy are compared with 
interest rates in the United States (Germany) if the domestic central bank pegs the currency to 
the 
dollar (deutsche mark). The interest-rate differential is constructed as the difference between real 
rates for the domestic and foreign countries. Real rates are deposit rates (IFS line 60) deflated 
using consumer prices (IFS line 64). 
14. Output: For most countries, the measure of output used is industrial production (IFS line 66). 
However, for some countries, (the commodity exporters) an index of out-put of primary 
commodities is used (IFS lines 66aa) if industrial production is not available. 
15. Stock returns: IFC global indices are used for all emerging markets; for industrial countries 
the quotes from the main boards are used. All stock prices are in US dollars. 
16. GDP: Consolidated public-sector deficit as a share of GDP (World Development 
Indicators, various issues) 
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 Footnotes 
1.  See Maurice Obstfeld (1994 and 1995) and Calvo (1995). 
2.  See Carmen M. Reinhart and Carlos A.Végh (1996) for a review of this literature and the empirical 
regularities. 
3.  The construction of the index is described in the data Appendix. The dates of the crises appear in 
Appendix Table 1, the level of the index and key events around the crises dates are reported in working 
paper version of this paper, Graciela L. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). 
4.   Bank stocks could be an indicator, but in many of the developing countries an important share of the 
banks are not traded publicly. 
5. If the peak month for the banking crisis is not known, we list the midpoint of that year as the date. 
6. The real exchange rate is used, as high inflation countries will typically have larger nominal 
devaluations. 
7.   M2 to reserves captures to what extent the liabilities of the banking system are backed by 
international reserves.  In the event of a currency crisis, individuals may rush to convert their domestic 
currency deposits into foreign currency, so that this ratio captures the ability of the central bank to meet 
those demands (Calvo and Mendoza ,1996).             
8.  An increase in the real exchange rate index denotes a depreciation. 
9.  Detailed definitions of all the variables and their sources are provided in the data Appendix. 
10. See Appendix Tables 1 and 2 for a detailed indication of any missing data around crisis dates. 
11.  See Galbis (1993).   
12.  See Sundararajan and Baliño (1991). 
13.  For example, in the boom period leading up to the 1981 Argentine banking crisis, stock returns (in 
U.S. dollars) were as high as 813 percent during the 12 months ending May 1979; by May 1981, the 
12-month capital loss was 60 percent. The crash in asset values is cited in most case studies as an 
important factor contributing to the problems of the banks.  Also, due to either mismanagement or 
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outright fraud, in many of the crises in our sample a substantial portion of banks and finance companies 
were considerably overexposed to real estate.   
14. See, for instance, James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson (1989), Francis Diebold and Glen Rudebusch 
(1989), and Reinhart and Vincent R. Reinhart (1996). 
15.  An 18- and 12-month window were also used; the results are available from the authors. 
16.  The definition of noise-to-signal ratio used throughout is best illustrated by considering the following 
two-by-two matrix: 
 
 
 
Crisis occurs in the following 24 
months 
 
No crisis occurs in the following 
24 months 
 
Indicator issues a signal 
 
A 
 
B 
 
Indicators does not issue a 
signal 
 
C 
 
D 
 
If a variable signals and a crisis occurs in the following 24 months (counted in cell A) the signal is 
considered accurate. If a variable signals and no crisis occurs in that time frame (counted in cell B), the 
signal is said to be a false alarm or noise. Hence, a perfect indicator would only have entries in cells in A 
and D.  More generally, the noise-to-signal ratio for any indicator is given by the number of entries in 
[B/(B+D)]/[A/(A+C)]. Hence, it is the ratio of false signals to all possible bad signals divided by the ratio 
of good signals to all possible good signals.  An extremely noisy indicator would have few entries in A 
and D, many in B. 
17.  For a discussion of the evolving nature of crises see the working paper, Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1996). 
18.  These are reported for each crisis in column 17 of the Appendix tables. 
19.  See Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) and Krugman (1996).   
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